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Abstract. Pervasive communications bring along new privacy chal-
lenges, fueled by the capability of mobile devices to communicate with,
and thus “sniﬀ on”, each other directly. We design a new mechanism
that aims at achieving location privacy in these forthcoming mobile net-
works, whereby mobile nodes collect the pseudonyms of the nodes they
encounter to generate their own privacy cloaks. Thus, privacy emerges
from the mobile network and users gain control over the disclosure of
their locations. We call this new paradigm self-organized location pri-
vacy. In this work, we focus on the problem of self-organized anonymous
authentication that is a necessary prerequisite for location privacy. We
investigate, using graph theory, the optimality of diﬀerent cloak construc-
tions and evaluate with simulations the achievable anonymity in various
network topologies. We show that peer-to-peer wireless communications
and mobility help in the establishment of self-organized anonymous au-
thentication in mobile networks.
1 Introduction
The current model of wireless communication relies heavily on infrastructure:
Two mobile phones have to go through cellular base stations to exchange calls
and data for which users pay, even if they are only a few meters apart. But as
more mobile devices become equipped with ad hoc (peer-to-peer) communica-
tion technologies, such as WiFi and Bluetooth, the coexistence of both peer-to-
peer and infrastructure-based communications is inevitable. Moreover, the recent
surge in mobile social networks [1,2] reinforces the need for mobile devices, such
as phones, to be able to talk to each other without going through the infrastruc-
ture. These peer-to-peer communications enable context-based applications, such
as dating [3], gaming [4], as well as distributed location-based services [43]. But
these communications also make possible the continuous tracking of the location
of these devices. Thus, whereas the standard privacy threat model focuses on
protecting users with respect to the infrastructure (be it the cellular network
or the Internet), pervasive communications will expand it to the whole set of
mobile devices.
The promised ad hoc sharing of information might turn into a pervasive night-
mare if undesired communications cannot be ﬁltered out: For example, if mobile
nodes cannot verify the source of information, they are susceptible to mobile
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spam. To thwart rogue devices from polluting the network, nodes should au-
thenticate each other: The existence of an authentication feature (and the im-
plied procedure to obtain the appropriate credentials) makes it more diﬃcult
for attackers to join the network in the ﬁrst place and thus increases the cost
of misbehavior. Hence, by verifying the authenticity of their interlocutor before
exchanging information, mobile nodes reduce the amount of undesired data.
For example, users of context-based applications would obtain authentication
credentials by subscribing to the service. They could subsequently verify that
received messages were sent by other subscribers to the service. But if this is
done without appropriate precautions, the authentication mechanism would then
reveal the identity of the nodes, thus rendering the privacy problem particularly
challenging.
The location privacy of mobile devices is guaranteed if and only if devices
are anonymous and untraceable. Hence, our quest for location privacy in the
upcoming generation of mobile computing becomes an attempt to devise mech-
anisms for untraceable anonymous authentication. More speciﬁcally, mobile de-
vices must authenticate themselves directly to other devices without revealing
privacy-sensitive information. In this paper, we assume that the authentication
mechanism should not rely on the constant presence of a central authority be-
cause of the scalability and accessibility problems that this would cause. We also
leave the privacy threat of authentication towards the infrastructure out of the
scope of the paper. We show that the seeming disadvantage, privacy-wise, of peer-
to-peer communications can actually be turned into an advantage, thus allowing
each node to create its own privacy cloak without the need for a central privacy
coordination service. We coin this new paradigm self-organized location privacy.
In this work, we focus on the analysis of anonymity as it is a prerequisite
for untraceability: If nodes cannot be anonymous, they cannot be untraceable.
The key enablers of our solution are the groups of users themselves and a crypto-
graphic construction called ring signatures [34] that allows a node to authenticate
itself to other nodes by using a ring of pseudonyms, instead of its pseudonym
alone. This ring constitutes the anonymity set of the node and can be constructed
out of the pseudonyms of the node’s past and present encounters without any
interactive protocols. Hence, our mechanism provides self-organized anonymous
authentication. The advantage of this approach is that each user only owns a
single authenticated pseudonym. But we show that rings alone are insuﬃcient
to protect user privacy: By analyzing the diﬀerent pseudonyms used in rings,
an eavesdropper can link - with a suﬃciently high probability - some rings to
users. As described in this paper, the problem gets worse if the network of nodes
grows. Hence, it is crucial to construct rings using mechanisms that maximize
user anonymity. We develop a graph-theoretic model to evaluate diﬀerent ring
construction strategies and derive the optimal (in terms of achieved anonymity)
ring constructions. Leveraging on each node’s local knowledge and history of en-
counters, we devise self-organizing methods to achieve, in practice, near-optimal
anonymity. We show with simulations that mobility and peer-to-peer communi-
cations are beneﬁcial for the emergence of self-organized location privacy.
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The paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we review the state of the
art. In Section 3, we present the system and threat models assumed throughout
the paper. After introducing our proposed solution in Section 4, we analyze in
Section 5 the achievable anonymity using a graph-theoretic model and evaluate
the solution in Section 6. Finally, in Section 7 we discuss the cost of our approach
and present remaining challenges. In that section, we also provide preliminary
results addressing the untraceability requirement before concluding in Section 8.
2 Related Work
There are several techniques available to achieve anonymous authentication.
A large body of work focuses on the use of multiple pseudonyms [15] and,
in particular, in mobile scenarios [7,24]. Instead of using a single pseudonym,
mobile devices are preloaded with a set of pseudonyms and change over time
the pseudonym used for sending messages. To impede an adversary from link-
ing old and new pseudonyms, the change of pseudonyms must be spatially and
temporally coordinated among mobile nodes in regions called mix zones [8]. The
analysis in [7,20,21] shows that the achieved location privacy depends on the
node density and on the unpredictability of node movements in mix zones. The
main drawbacks of mix zones is that they are ineﬃcient when the node density in
the mix zone is low and can be costly in terms of pseudonym management. A re-
lated technique uses frequently changing pseudonyms, silent periods, and power
control to hide privacy-sensitive information [26]. As we will see, our approach
alleviates the problem of low densities in mix zones by relying on the history
of encounters of mobile nodes, instead of strictly using their current neighbors.
In addition, we alleviate the problem of pseudonym management by allowing a
single pseudonym per device.
Another solution relies on group signatures [16] that allow a group member to
sign on behalf of a group without revealing the identity of the signer. Nowadays,
highly eﬃcient group signatures schemes exist with constant size signatures and
eﬃcient signing and veriﬁcation even when nodes are revoked [10,13,31]. But
group signatures require a group manager to add and revoke group members,
thus making the ﬂexibility of groups dependent on the availability and compu-
tational capacity of the group manager. In contrast, with ring signatures, nodes
can change the members of their rings without central coordination.
Anonymous credential systems (e.g., Idemix [11]) allowmobile nodes to anony-
mously authenticate to third parties with the help of an online credential issuer.
The online availability of a credential issuer is often not possible in wireless
networks. To circumvent the issue, techniques based on unclonable identiﬁers,
such as e-tokens [12], allow nodes to anonymously authenticate themselves a
given number of times per period. However, such techniques lack ﬂexibility, in
particular in the case of a prolonged unavailability of the credential issuer.
To the best of our knowledge, we are the ﬁrst to investigate the potential
of ring signatures to achieve anonymity and untraceability in mobile networks.
Until now, most of the work focused on proving properties of ring signatures [41]
or on the anonymity and unlinkability of the signature generation process [28].
Self-organized Anonymous Authentication in Mobile Ad Hoc Networks 353
Recently, ring signatures were proposed in [29] as a building block for anonymous
routing in MANET but without investigation of the ring creation process.
3 Preliminaries
3.1 System Model
We assume a mobile network with n mobile nodes and a single oﬄine Certiﬁ-
cation Authority (CA) run by an independent trusted third party. We focus on
scenarios where the mobile nodes are autonomous entities equipped with WiFi
or Bluetooth-enabled devices that communicate with each other upon coming in
range. In other words, we describe a pervasive communication system in which
mobile nodes automatically exchange information upon meeting.
Prior to entering the network, each mobile node registers with the CA that
preloads a single public/private key pair (Ki,K−1i ) and a digital certiﬁcate in the
nodes’ device. The CA veriﬁes the identity of each user upon registration. The
public key Ki serves as the identiﬁer of node i and is referred to as its pseudonym
Pi. The private key K−1i permits mobile node i to digitally sign messages, while
the digital certiﬁcate validates the authenticity of the signature.
We assume that mobile nodes automatically exchange information as soon
as they are in communication range. To do so, mobile nodes advertise their
presence by periodically broadcasting proximity beacons containing the node’s
authenticating information (i.e., the sender attaches its pseudonym to signed
messages). When a node receives a beacon, it veriﬁes the authenticity of the
sender before reading the message.
3.2 Threat Model
We assume that a passive adversaryA aims to track the location of mobile nodes.
In practice, the adversary can be a rogue individual, a set of malicious mobile
nodes or may even deploy its own infrastructure (e.g., by placing eavesdrop-
ping devices in the network). In the worst case, A obtains a complete coverage
and tracks nodes throughout the entire network. We characterize this type of
adversary as global.
A collects identifying information (i.e., pseudonyms) from the entire network
and attempts to break the anonymity provided by ring signatures in order to
track the location of mobile nodes. If the adversary is successful, it can implicitly
obtain the true identity of the owner of a mobile node from the analysis of its
mobility [27]. Hence, the location privacy of mobile nodes cannot be taken for
granted.
Finally, we assume that the key-pair generation process cannot be altered or
controlled by the adversary.
3.3 Problem Statement
The location of mobile nodes can be tracked based on the information leaked
from authentication messages. To thwart this threat, we deﬁne the following
design goals:
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– Anonymous authentication: The nodes should be able to authenticate
to each other without being identiﬁable. Anonymous authentication permits
mobile nodes to verify the origin of received messages without revealing their
identity (neither to the receiver, nor to an eavesdropper).
– Self-Organization: The anonymity of nodes should not depend on the con-
stant presence of a central authority because of the scalability and accessi-
bility problems this would cause (the CA distributes pseudonyms to nodes
prior to their entrance in the network but is not always accessible). With
self-organization, the cost of anonymity management is distributed among
all the nodes.
It should be noted that we do not consider accountability as a design goal. Indeed,
like many Internet applications, the peer-to-peer wireless scenarios we study do
not require it.
4 Self-organized Anonymous Authentication
In this section, we describe the techniques that permit the emergence of self-
organized anonymous authentication.
4.1 Overview
With standard asymmetric cryptography, nodes authenticate themselves to oth-
ers by signing their messages with their private key and providing the public key
for signature veriﬁcation, thereby revealing their identity. Instead, self-organized
anonymous authentication, explained in detail in the next section, allows a node
to select a set of pseudonyms called a ring and then sign its messages with a Ring
Signature (RS) [34]. A RS preserves the cryptographic anonymity of the signer
because it cannot be distinguished among the members of the ring.1 Besides,
rings are setup-free: The knowledge of the pseudonyms of the other nodes is suf-
ﬁcient to create a ring without any interaction. Hence, unlike group signatures,
RSs have no group managers and do not require any coordination among ring
members. Finally, two signatures generated by the same signer with the same
ring are cryptographically unlinkable. Of course, to be able to generate a RS,
each node must always use its own pseudonym in its ring, thus guaranteeing the
authentication requirement.
The pseudonyms used for constructing rings can be collected by downloading
sets of rings from online databases, much like PGP keyrings, or, in the case of
the mobile network considered here, by recording the pseudonyms of neighboring
nodes in a history Si. Each node constructs a ring of pseudonyms by selecting a
subset of pseudonyms from its history of encounters. This allows nodes to have
an anonymity set without any central coordination: Rings are dynamically and
1 In this paper, anonymity and untraceability are evaluated with respect to the pseu-
donyms used in rings and not with respect to the signature generation process, thus
the distinction “cryptographic”.
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independently created by mobile nodes. A node i can thus authenticate itself to
other nodes at time t by sending a message m with a ring signature RSi,t(m)
created with ring Ri,t. It is worth making a clear distinction between the notions
of “node” i, “pseudonym” Pi and “ring” Ri,t. Mobile nodes are indexed by a
counter i (that does not refer to any ordering of the nodes). A mobile node i is
represented in the network by its pseudonym Pi. In order to avoid being tracked
by its pseudonym, i actually uses a set of pseudonyms of other nodes together
with its own pseudonym Pi, to create its ring Ri,t at time t.
Authenticating the source of information is a crucial primitive in pervasive
communication systems to limit the spread of undesired data. By signing a mes-
sage with a ring of pseudonyms, a signer proves its membership to a club of nodes
(e.g., a mobile social network). The veriﬁer can then be sure that a message orig-
inates from a member of the club. Of course, all members of a ring should have
the appropriate credentials - the pseudonyms have been certiﬁed by the CA -
and belong to the club; otherwise their presence in the ring would invalidate its
authenticity. For simplicity of presentation, we consider in the rest of the paper
that there is a single club of members encompassing all the legitimate nodes of
the network.
4.2 Anonymous Authentication with Ring Signatures
Ring signatures were formalized by Rivest, Shamir and Tauman in [34] as an
anonymous signature scheme. A ring signature allows a member of an ad hoc
collection of users, i.e., the ring, to prove to any veriﬁer that a message was sent
by a member of the ring. An authenticated message does not leak the identity of
its signer. Every node i has a ring Ri,t at time t that is composed of a ﬁnite subset
of the collection P of all pseudonyms in the network: Ri,t = {..., Pi, Pj , ...}. Let
Rt = {R1,t, R2,t, ...} be the set of rings in the network at time t. Based on the
pseudonyms in their local histories, mobile nodes decide which pseudonyms to
use in their rings. We call this the ring construction strategy.
Ring signatures can be constructed upon any type of public key cryptographic
primitive [6]. What is common to these schemes is that ring signatures are based
on combining functions:
CH,v(T0, T1, ..., Tri−1) = v (1)
where H is a secure cryptographic hash function, v is a random glue value, ri is
the size of the ring (constant over time) and Tk, k = 0, ..., ri − 1, are randomly
generated values except for one that requires the knowledge of a secret key to
solve (1).
For eﬃciency reasons, we consider the ring signature scheme presented in [41]
in which the combining function C relies on bilinear pairings and the public key
cryptosystem is identity-based (i.e., ID-based cryptography [36]). In ID-based
cryptography, the knowledge of the identiﬁer (i.e., pseudonym) of a node is suf-
ﬁcient to validate the authenticity of its signature. This reduces the communica-
tion overhead because it avoids the use of certiﬁcates accompanying signatures
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generated by traditional cryptosystems such as RSA and ECC. The Achilles’
heel of ID-based cryptosystems has always been their slower speed compared
to other cryptosystems. But the recent introduction of eﬃcient algorithms for
computing pairings starts showing its feasibility on mobile devices [40]. We will
elaborate more on the corresponding costs in Section 7. In ID-based cryptogra-
phy the CA must be replaced by a Private Key Generator (PKG). A common
critique of ID-based cryptography is that the PKG must be trusted to gener-
ate/protect private keys, and can forge signatures on behalf of the nodes (i.e.,
the key escrow problem). But for the applications considered here, we assume
that the PKG (i.e., the CA) is trusted.
Let G be a Gap Diﬃe Hellman (GDH) group of prime order q. When a mobile
node i wants to send a message m at time t, it ﬁrst constructs a ring Ri,t by
selecting ri pseudonyms (including its own pseudonym) out of its history. The
ring signature is an ri + 1 tuple of random values Tk ∈ G for k = 0, 1, ..., ri − 1
and of c0 ∈ G:
(c0, T0, T1, ..., Tri−1) (2)
where c0 is an initialization value for the ring creation; it contains the hash of
the message m. Tk are randomly generated values except for one (only known
to user i) that solves (1) with v = 0 and requires the knowledge of the secret
key K−1i . We denote RSi,t(m) = (c0, T0, T1, ..., Tri−1) the ring signature on a
message m sent by node i. To avoid replay attacks, the message m also contains
a timestamp. The entire packet sent over the air looks as follows:
m,Ri,t, RSi,t(m) (3)
4.3 Anonymous Communications
Upon receiving a message, a node validates its signature before reading it. The
receiver can reply to the message to initiate a communication session. To do
so, two nodes establish a security association through an authenticated key ex-
change, e.g., ring signatures can be used in conjunction with the Diﬃe-Hellman
protocol [29].
However, in order to allow for bidirectional communications, mobile nodes
must be identiﬁable in the short term. Much to the detriment of privacy, mobile
nodes already make use of long term identiﬁers, such as MAC (Medium Access
Control) addresses, to communicate on the data link. For example, in IEEE
802.11, the MAC addresses are 48-bit values included in frames to identify the
source or destination of a frame. Hence, whereas rings can provide an appro-
priate layer of anonymity at the application layer, the MAC addresses have to
be anonymized to serve uniquely for short term communications. One approach
consists in changing the MAC address [24] every time the ring changes, to pre-
serve the anonymity created by the ring while still being able to identify nodes
in the short term. The MAC address can be generated randomly, taking into
account that collisions must be avoided. In [23], the authors suggest another
approach based on an identiﬁer-free link layer protocol. Basically, their solution
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increases the diﬃculty of proﬁling users from the link layer by obscuring long
term explicit identiﬁers.
Finally, it must be noted that, at the physical layer, the wireless transceiver
has a wireless fingerprint that can identify mobile devices in the long term [33].
However, this requires a costly installation for the adversary and stringent con-
ditions on the wireless medium. A more generic approach consists in the analysis
of the signal power of mobile devices to track their locations. It is still an open
problem to determine how much identifying information a sophisticated adver-
sary can extract from the physical layer.
5 Anonymity Analysis
In this section, we evaluate the anonymity provided by rings, considering a pas-
sive adversary.We show how to optimally construct rings to maximize the achiev-
able anonymity.
5.1 Attack Description
A global and passive adversary observes the rings used by the nodes to authen-
ticate each other over time (Fig. 1). Based on this information, it attempts to
de-anonymize rings signatures.
Given a ring alone, an adversary is unable to determine the identity of the
ring owner because of the cryptographic anonymity of ring signatures. However,
if an adversary obtains all the rings used at time t in the network, it can infer the
most probable owner of each ring by analyzing the ring members. For example,
node i constructs a ring Ri,t of size ri. It uses its pseudonym Pi and selects ri−1
pseudonyms out of its history. If no other ring in the network uses pseudonym
Pi, the adversary can conclude that ring Ri corresponds to pseudonym Pi (e.g.,
node u4 in Fig. 2 (a)). A methodic analysis of ring members can thus reverse
the anonymity provided by rings. Repeating this attack for each t, the adversary
can track the locations of mobile nodes. In this section, we focus on the analysis
of anonymity, which, as explained above, is a prerequisite to untraceability. The
adversary will thus analyze snapshots of rings (columns in Fig. 1). Without loss
t
R1,1
...
R1,2 R1,3
...
R2,1 R2,2 R2,3
R3,1 R3,2 R3,3
Rn,1 Rn,2 Rn,3
1 2 3
Fig. 1. Rings over time. An adversary will observe sets of rings changing over time and
try to track the locations of mobile nodes. Ri,t is the ring of node i at time t.
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u1
u2
u3
u4
P1
P2
P3
P4
U V
R1
(a)
u1
u2
u3
u4
P1
P2
P3
P4
U V
(b)
Fig. 2. Two examples of bipartite graphs G. (a) Rings are R1 = {P1, P2}, R2 =
{P2, P3}, R3 = {P3, P4}, and R4 = {P4}. (b) Rings are R1 = {P1, P2, P3}, R2 =
{P1, P2, P3}, R3 = {P3}, and R4 = {P2, P4}.
of generality, we write in the following Ri,t = Ri and RSi,t(m) = RSi(m). The
adversary can also try to defeat the untraceability of rings by linking resembling
rings over time to the same ring owner (rows of Fig. 1). Section 7 will give
preliminary results on the untraceability analysis.
5.2 Graph-Theoretic Model
A set of rings can be modeled with a bipartite graph G = (U ∪ V,E), where
U = {ui}ni=1 is the set of nodes, V = {Pj}nj=1 is the set of pseudonyms and
E ⊆ U×V is the set of edges. A graph is bipartite if its vertices can be partitioned
into two sets such that no edge connects vertices in the same set. If a pseudonym
Pj is in Ri, then we say that the node ui using Ri is connected to Pj and we
create an edge (ui, Pj) ∈ E. We consider a balanced graph, that is, there are
|U | = |V | = n nodes in the system. There are |E| = e edges directed from U to
V . We denote din the in-degree of a node in V , i.e., the number of edges directed
towards the node. Similarly, dout denotes the out-degree of a node in U , i.e.,
the number of edges directed away from the node (the size of the ring). Two
possible bipartite graphs are illustrated in Fig. 2. Graphs are simple if there are
no multiple edges between two nodes.
After modeling rings with a graph G, A aims to discover which among the
pseudonym Pj ∈ Ri corresponds to the node ui. To do so, A must ﬁnd the most
likely mapping of pseudonyms in V onto nodes in U . In graph-theoretic terms,
A is looking for an assignment of nodes in V to nodes in U in the bipartite
graph G. An assignment is a matching if no two edges share a common vertex.
A perfect matching is a matching that covers all vertices of the graph. A must
thus ﬁnd the most probable perfect matching.
To do so,A assigns probabilities to all edges of the graph: pj|i is the probability
that pseudonym Pj in V corresponds to node ui in U . Hence, the graph G
is weighted with probabilities computed by the adversary. Finally, A can ﬁnd
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the most probable perfect matching by computing the maximum-weight perfect
matching over the weighted bipartite graph G.
Measuring Anonymity. The individual anonymity of a node ui (i.e., the
uncertainty of an adversary about the identity of node ui [35]) can be measured
by:
Hi = −
ri∑
j=1
pj|i log2(pj|i) (4)
which is the entropy of the random variable pj|i and where ri = |Ri| is the size
of the ring of node ui.
A priori, the adversary will choose probability pj|i equal to 1/douti as each
outgoing edge is equally likely to be chosen. In Fig. 6(a), the entropy yields with
this approach a non-zero anonymity for all but the last node. However, by doing
so, the adversary focuses on the anonymity of individual nodes and overlooks
some important properties of the system as a whole [19]. A clever adversary
would eliminate many possible assignments by working backwards from vertices
with a degree of one and the entropy would then yield a zero anonymity for all
nodes.
A can thus ﬁrst consider all assignments mk of the elements of V onto U
before computing pj|i a posteriori [7,38]. The probability of an assignment mk
is given by:
p(mk) =
∏
l∈mk
wl
where wl is the weight of edge l in G. The weight is the a priori probability pj|i
and we write wl = 1/douti where node ui is the origin of edge l. Because all the
weights of the edges leaving a node are equal, all perfect matchings are equally
likely and we have: p(mk) = p(m).
Hence, the probability of a perfect matching, i.e., the probability that an
assignment is perfect knowing the set of all perfect matchings M , is:
p(mk|M) = p(mk,M)
p(M)
=
p(mk)
p(M)
=
p(mk)∑|M|
k=1 p(mk)
=
1
|M |
where mk ∈M for k ∈ [0, |M |], and p(M) is the sum of probabilities of all perfect
matchings. The a posteriori probability pj|i is ﬁnally computed by considering
all perfect matchings containing the pair (ui, Pj).
pj|i =
∑
mk∈M|(ui,Pj)∈mk
p(mk|M) (5)
In words, the number of perfect matchings going over an edge determines the
weight of an edge. Hence, the anonymity of a node not only depends on its out-
degree but also on the distribution of perfect matchings, i.e., the structure of the
bipartite graph. Considering again the example in Fig. 2 (a), there is a single
perfect matching in the graph, and consequently the anonymity of each node
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Si
Ri
fi
…
Pj
…
…
Pj
...
Pi
Pi
Fig. 3. Ring construction. To construct its ring Ri, node ui uses its pseudonym Pi and
selects, according to its strategy fi, ri − 1 pseudonyms out of its history Si.
is null. To further illustrate the result, consider the example in Fig. 2 (b) and
observe node 4. To compute p4|4, we consider all the perfect matchings with the
pair (4, 4). In fact, every perfect matching in the graph contains that pair because
din4 = 1, hence p4|4 = 1. The same analysis is true for node 3 as dout3 = 1. Still,
nodes 1 and 2 have a non-zero anonymity. In other words, both the in-degrees
of nodes in V and out-degrees of nodes in U aﬀect the distribution of perfect
matchings and determine the probability pj|i.
Complexity. The analysis presented above is diﬃcult to carry out in prac-
tice because of its complexity: All perfect matchings must be found. Itai et al.
introduce in [25] a polynomial time algorithm to ﬁnd all perfect matchings in
a bipartite graph. The algorithm starts from a perfect matching to iteratively
produce them all in O(e · (√n+ |M |)) time. The algorithm remains hard to use,
as the number of nodes n can be extremely large and the number of matchings
|M | increases exponentially with the number of nodes. The adversary could thus
focus on small sets of rings using, for example, the divide and conquer approach
presented in [22].
5.3 Ring Construction Problem
Fig. 3 illustrates the ring construction process: Each node ui obtains a ring Ri
of size ri by using its pseudonym Pi and choosing ri − 1 pseudonyms from its
history Si. Rings must be carefully created to obtain high anonymity. The ring
construction strategy of node ui gives the criteria to include a pseudonym from
ui’s history in its ring. We deﬁne it as a function fi : 2P → 2P . The selected
pseudonyms must belong to ui’s history: fi(X) ⊆ X where X ⊆ P is a set
of pseudonyms. The number of selected pseudonyms must not exceed the ring
size: |fi(X)| ≤ ri. In this paper, we consider that all nodes use the same ring
construction strategy: fi = f .
The ring construction problem consists in ﬁnding the ring construction that
maximizes anonymity. To do so, we must obtain the optimal graph that maxi-
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mizes the achievable anonymity for all nodes:
max
G
(Hi) ∀ui ∈ U (6)
subject to:
1 ≤ douti ≤ dmax (7)
(ui, Pj) ∈ E ⇔ Pj ∈ f(Si) (8)
Equation (7) conﬁnes the out-degrees douti to a maximum d
max. The graph con-
struction is constrained by (8): The resulting graph G depends on the informa-
tion collected by the nodes (their knowledge of pseudonyms). In other words,
we seek to obtain a graph that maximizes the level of anonymity of every node
constrained by the maximum out-degree and using a distributed construction
function f (i.e., self-organization).
Optimal Graph G. As illustrated in Fig. 2, the distribution of the node in-
/out-degrees aﬀects the anonymity of each node. Let us introduce the following
notation: G\(ui,Pj) corresponds to graph G without the edge (ui, Pj).
The following Theorem identiﬁes the graphs that provide the maximum
anonymity. The proof is provided in the Appendix.
Theorem 1. Anonymity is maximal if and only if every vertex in the bipartite
graph G has the same degree dmax and for each i, the subgraphs G\(ui,Pj) ⊆ G
for all Pj ∈ Ri are isomorphic to each other. The anonymity of each node is
then log2(d
max).
Theorem 1 characterizes the optimal graph G that maximizes the achievable
anonymity. Basically, all subgraphs of G obtained by removing an edge starting
at one node must be isomorphic. The isomorphism property captures the notion
of similarity between subgraphs: If subgraphs are similar (i.e., have the same
structure), it is more diﬃcult to distinguish nodes in G. A large body of work has
studied the existence of graph isomorphism and shown that the problem is NP: It
belongs to its own complexity class, neither known to be solvable in polynomial
time nor NP-complete [9,17]. In other words, theory says that it might be hard
to determine whether two graphs are isomorphic. However, in practice, the graph
isomorphism problem is easy to solve in polynomial time with heuristics [5]. It is
thus possible in principle to determine whether subgraphs are isomorphic and,
as a consequence, whether a graph G provides maximum anonymity.
In the following, we will compare the anonymity provided by diﬀerent graph
constructions and will see that regular graphs perform best. In fact, the local
structure of the graph (i.e., the way each node is connected) determines whether
subgraph isomorphisms can exist. In particular, the regularity of graphs is a
necessary condition in our scenario for subgraphs to be isomorphic to each other
(see Appendix).
6 Ring Construction Strategies
In the previous section, we examined the achievable anonymity with rings and
derived necessary conditions (i.e., regular and isomorphic) to maximize it. In
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this section, we evaluate the performance of diﬀerent graph constructions by
means of simulations. The simulations are carried out in C++ using the LEDA
library [30] to manipulate graphs. First, we assume that the nodes know the
entire network and show the superiority of regular constructions over random
graphs. The results are averaged over 20 runs with a running example of 10
nodes, which is suﬃcient to evaluate the eﬀect of ring construction strategies
with a reasonable simulation complexity. Then, we approximate the achievable
anonymity on geometric graphs with 100 mobile nodes that only know a portion
of the entire network.
6.1 Random Graphs
Let us assume that the nodes are aware of all the pseudonyms in the network
(i.e., Si = P , ∀ui). With a random graph construction f rand, mobile nodes
choose pseudonyms randomly: We consider a bipartite Erdos-Renyi random
graph G(n, p) where n is the number of nodes and each edge is included in
the graph with probability p independently of others. With such graphs, the
in-/out-degree distribution is binomial Pr(di = k) =
(
n
k
)
pk(1− p)(n−k) with av-
erage E[di] = np and variance var[di] = np(1− p). Fig. 4 (a) shows the average
distribution of the achieved entropy. We observe that the average anonymity
increases with the edge density p, whereas the average variance decreases when
p approaches 0 or 1. In other words, with a low or high density of edges, the
achievable anonymity has a narrow distribution. As p → 1, the graph becomes
complete (i.e., all nodes are connected) and thus optimal in terms of anonymity.
We compare the performance of random and r-regular graphs in Fig. 4 (b) by
computing their minimum and mean anonymity. We observe that regular graphs
have a near-optimal behavior as they approach the maximum achievable anony-
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Fig. 4. Comparison of random and regular graphs. (a) Entropy distribution of random
graphs with an increasing edge density p. The x-axis is divided into bins of size 0.3
and the y-axis represents the fraction of nodes in each bin. (b) Minimum and mean
entropy levels of random and r-regular graph constructions.
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mity log2(r). Random graphs perform poorly, illustrating the importance of
regular degree distributions: Nodes with a low in-/out-degree have lower anony-
mity, which is hardly compensated by nodes with a higher degree as the anony-
mity is logarithmic. The node degree variance induces a larger anonymity vari-
ance. Thus, to guarantee a minimal level of anonymity, the mean degree must
be even larger.
As n → ∞, the node degree distribution is approximated by a Poisson dis-
tribution with parameter λ = np. As the variance of the degree distribution
equals the mean, it will be large and reduce the average anonymity. Bollobas
in [9] notably investigates the asymptotic distribution of the degree sequence of
graphs and proves that random graph constructions do not permit to guarantee
predictable minimal and maximal degrees: the minimum and maximum degrees
are essentially determined (by a function whose exact value is unknown). Bol-
lobas further demonstrates that for some values of p (Theorem 3.5, [9]), there is
a minimal degree dmin ≥ 2. However, in this case, the maximum degree is not
ﬁnite. In other words, as the graph grows larger, the degree sequence of random
graphs is unpredictable and the performance gap with regular graphs increases.
6.2 Kout Graphs
We evaluate whether introducing a structure in the graph construction increases
the achievable anonymity. We impose the same ﬁxed out-degree dout = K to
every node to obtain a Kout graph [9]. We consider various ring construction
strategies with and without the help of a central entity.
Centralized Algorithm. The central entity is a network coordinator that
knows the in-/out-degrees of each node and generates regular graphs from Kout
graphs. Bollobas in [9] suggests a pairing model (i.e., a ring construction f reg)
to construct regular graphs with a centralized algorithm: Every vertex of the
graph is connected to K nodes uniformly at random forming Kn pairs. If there
are no multiple edges between two same nodes, the resulting graph is a random
regular graph.
Distributed Algorithm. In the absence of a central entity, the nodes must
decide individually with whom to connect. Each vertex ui ∈ U uses its pseudo-
nym Pi and randomly selects K − 1 vertices from V . As all
(
n−1
K−1
)
choices are
equiprobable, the probability that a pseudonym Pj is chosen by another node is
the ratio of assignments containing Pj over all possible assignments:
p = Pr(“Node ui picks Pj after K − 1 tries”)
=
(
n−2
K−2
)
(
n−1
K−1
) = K − 1
n− 1 (9)
The node in-degree distribution is then Pr(dini = k) =
(
n
k
)
pk(1 − p)n−k. Thus,
the average in-degree distribution is E[dini ] =
n
n−1 (K − 1) and the variance is
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Fig. 5. Comparison of various ring constructions f . (a) Entropy distributions. The x-
axis is divided into bins of size 0.3 and the y-axis represents the fraction of nodes in
each bin. (b) Fraction of correctly matched pseudonyms to rings.
var[dini ] =
n
n−1 (K − 1)(1− K−1n−1 ). Consequently, with the distributed algorithm,
the ring construction strategy fkRand heavily depends on the degree K.
Fig. 5 (a) compares the entropy distribution for various ring constructions.
We consider equivalent graphs constructions with n = 10 nodes, p = 4/10,
K = 4 and d = 4 for d-regular graphs. We observe that fkRand obtains a nar-
rower distribution of entropies than f rand, thus illustrating the importance of
a regular out-degree. If random graphs obtain the maximum entropy among all
constructions, they also have a smaller minimum entropy and lower average en-
tropy. f reg obtains very good results, close to the maximum achievable entropy
log2(d). This is due to the regularity of the in-degree distribution. With f
reg
and d = 4, the majority of the nodes are indistinguishable as their entropy is
22 = 4 equal to d. Like with random graphs, as n → ∞, the in-degree distribu-
tion of Kout graphs is Poissonian: The mean and variance approach K − 1. In
other words, the diﬀerence between regular and Kout graphs will increase as K
becomes large.
In Fig. 5 (b), we observe that the proportion of successful matchings of pseu-
donyms onto nodes (i.e., the adversary success ratio) varies signiﬁcantly among
graphs. In the worst case, the adversary cannot infer information statistically
and thus makes random attempts. The probability of success of the adversary is
then equal to 1/r. For regular graphs, A’s success is limited and approaches its
worst case strategy. In other words, A would do better by randomly matching
rings to pseudonyms. With random constructions however, the adversary can
infer signiﬁcant information: Even with rings composed of 6 nodes, 5 out of 10
nodes in the example are correctly matched.
6.3 Geometric Graphs
As discussed above, the introduction of a structure in the ring construction
dramatically increases the achievable anonymity. Still, the nodes were aware of
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all the pseudonyms in the network. In practice, mobile nodes will only have access
to information gathered from the network, i.e., the rings of their encounters. In
this section, we evaluate how the topology aﬀects the achievable anonymity.
In particular, as regular graph provide high anonymity, we study several ring
construction strategies to obtain a regular graph G. To take the network topology
into account, we consider a geometric graph Gg in which each vertex is associated
with a physical device. Two vertices are connected (i.e., learn each other’s rings)
if and only if they are within distance D(u, v) ≤ Γ of each other, where Γ is a
ﬁxed radius (i.e., the unit disk graph model). The geometric graph Gg models
the connection between nodes. We assume that the nodes are homogeneous (i.e.,
identical devices) and equipped with omnidirectional antennas. We consider both
static and mobile scenarios.
Static Scenario. In static scenarios, nodes learn the pseudonyms in the rings of
their direct neighbors. Indirectly, they also learn the pseudonyms of the neighbors
of their neighbors as they are passed along. Given a history Si and a ring size
ri = r, ∀ui, the probability that node ui chooses pseudonym Pj from its history
in its ring is: Pr(Pj ∈ Ri) = min (1, r/|Si|). For ﬁrst-hop neighbors of ui, the
probability of learning Pj corresponds to the probability that ui uses Pj , i.e.,
Pr(Pj ∈ Ri). In other words, the ring size determines the propagation rate of
pseudonyms in the network. For a x-hop neighbor ul of ui where x is larger
than 1, the probability that pseudonym Pj is used by all rings on a path Δi,l
from node ui to node ul is: Pr(Pj ∈ Rk, ∀k ∈ Δi,l) =
∏
∀k∈Δi,l min(1, r/|Sk|).
However, nodes belonging to disconnected sets of the graph Gg are isolated
from each other and have zero probability of learning each other’s pseudonyms.
Hence, the propagation of pseudonyms is limited by the graph connectivity as
well, reducing the potential size of anonymity sets. The topology of the network
thus critically aﬀects the achievable privacy. With the ring construction fstatic,
we consider that mobile nodes randomly choose pseudonyms from their local
history to construct their rings.
Mobile Scenario. We examine how mobility can lessen the negative impact
of topology: As nodes move in the network, they discover a larger portion of
the set of pseudonyms P . We consider the restricted random waypoint model
introduced in [14]. In the random waypoint model, a mobile node moves on a
continuous plane from its current position to a new position by randomly choos-
ing its destination coordinates, its speed and the amount of time it will pause
when it reaches the destination. After its pause, a node chooses a new destina-
tion and speed. This is repeated for each node until the end of the simulation
time. In the restricted model, the choice of destination points is restricted with
some probability φ to a set Ψ of ﬁxed points on a plane. With probability φ a
node randomly chooses a point from Ψ , and with probability 1− φ, a node will
choose a random point on the plane. This model is close to reality as users do
not choose their destinations randomly, but instead meet at cafe´s, bus stops, etc.
In this mobile environment, we evaluate various ring construction strategies
that aim at obtaining the most regular graph. These strategies capitalize on the
frequency and freshness of the appearance of pseudonyms.
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Fig. 6. Average anonymity set size for several ring construction strategies f in a mobile
scenario with φ = 0.5 and r = 4. (a) Average anonymity set size over time. (b)
Cumulative distribution function of the anonymity set.
Least Popular Strategy. With the least popular ring construction strategy,
each node maintains a counter for each pseudonym and selects the pseudonyms
with the lowest counter value (i.e., the least popular). We consider three vari-
ations of the strategy: In f cLeast, a central server informs the nodes of the in-
degree of members of their histories. In fsLeast, nodes choose in their histories
the pseudonyms that were used the least often. In foLeast, nodes choose in their
histories the pseudonyms that were used the least often in the rings of others.
Most Popular Strategy.We consider a most popular ring construction strategy
fMost in which the most popular nodes are chosen with the help of a central
server.
Random Strategy. With the random construction strategy fkRand, nodes
choose their ring members randomly from their local history.
We ran 20 simulations on a 500 × 500 m2 torus with n = 100 nodes, trans-
mission range = 25m, pause = 20s, history |S| = 10, ring size r = 4, |Ψ | = 5
and φ = 0.5. For simplicity and clarity, instead of computing the entropy, we
compute the anonymity sets of mobile nodes, which corresponds to the in-degree
distribution of graph Gg.
Fig. 6 (a) shows the evolution over time of the average anonymity set size of
mobile nodes. We observe that the achieved anonymity set in mobile scenarios
surpasses by far the static scenario but takes longer to converge. In general, we
observe a percolation region ([10, 102] seconds) where the anonymity set of the
nodes increases quickly, and then a region of convergence ([102, 103] seconds).
fstatic reaches a small anonymity set and is topped by all mobile strategies. Com-
paring mobility scenarios, we observe that f cLeast, foLeast and fsLeast improve
the average size of the anonymity set with respect to the fkRand (10% to 20%
improvement). We notice that foLeast performs slightly better than fsLeast as
it takes better advantage of mobility (i.e., nodes have a better global knowledge
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of rings) and approaches the performance of the centralized algorithm f cLeast.
The fMost approach seems to perform as well as the least popular approaches.
Fig. 6 (b) gives the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of the anonymity
set showing the fraction of nodes per anonymity set size. The spread of the
curve represents the variance across mobile nodes in the anonymity set sizes. We
observe that f cLeast performs well: It has a small variance as the majority of
the nodes has an anonymity set size equal to 4 (i.e., the ring size). foLeast and
fsLeast have a smaller variance than fkRand. Notably, with the foLeast approach,
fewer nodes (20% less) have a small anonymity set. Finally, we observe that the
fMost approach actually performs worse than all other strategies: As a small
number of nodes become extremely popular, the majority of nodes (90%) has
a small anonymity set. Hence, although the average anonymity set size is large
(Fig. 6 (a)), only a few nodes are actually anonymous, while others are easily
identiﬁable. As social networks (usually modeled with scale-free graphs) tend to
have this form, social networks based ring constructions would perform poorly.
In conclusion, the knowledge of the popularity of a pseudonym helps to achieve
high anonymity (i.e., the least popular strategy). The nodes can thus indepen-
dently aggregate information about their encounters and achieve anonymity in
a self-organized way (without harming the anonymity of other nodes). Hence,
peer-to-peer communications between mobile nodes enable privacy to emerge in
ad hoc wireless networks.
7 Discussion
In this section, we present preliminary results on the untraceability of rings,
explain their resilience to Sybil attacks, detail how revocation works and ﬁnally
discuss the cost of ring signatures.
7.1 Untraceability
Untraceability of rings is also required in order to achieve self-organized location
privacy. Similar to mix zones [7], mobile nodes can change their rings simulta-
neously upon meeting in the network. An external adversary will have to infer
the most probable matching of old and new rings. Mobile nodes are untrace-
able if the adversary is unlikely to successfully match rings. Unlike the multiple
pseudonym approach, in self-organized location privacy rings are correlated over
time. Hence, by analyzing the similarity of ring members over time, an adver-
sary could statistically estimate the matching of rings and track mobile nodes
in the network. For example, if ring members remain constant, an adversary
trivially tracks the whereabouts of mobile nodes. Ring members must thus vary:
Except for the pseudonym Pi of the ring creator ui, a ring Ri,t+1 can be entirely
diﬀerent from the previous ring Ri,t. Still, if all but one pseudonym are system-
atically updated, an adversary tracks mobile nodes by identifying persistent ring
members.
In order to defeat an attack on untraceability by an external adversary A,
ring members must evolve with time depending on both past ring members and
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new encounters. Therefore, on top of the self-organization involved to achieve
anonymity, mobile nodes must coordinate the evolution of their ring members to
obtain untraceability. One possible way to coordinate the evolution of rings is to
cluster ring members. The clustering coeﬃcient of a vertex is used to quantify
how close the vertex and its neighbors are to being a complete graph [39]. In our
case, the clustering coeﬃcient of a node measures the number of common ring
members it shares with nearby nodes. The clustering coeﬃcient of ring members
results in an overlap of rings, which hardens the attack by A. Mobile nodes
can cluster their rings in a self-organized way by favoring pseudonyms recently
observed: Newly acquired pseudonyms have a higher probability of being chosen
in a ring. Preliminary results have demonstrated the success of this approach.
We leave the formal investigation of this method for future work.
7.2 Sybil Attacks and Revocation
If a single node can present multiple identities, it can control a substantial frac-
tion of the system and thereby undermine its security. These Sybil attacks [18]
are not possible if there is a central entity to vouch for a one-to-one correspon-
dence between entity and identity. In our model, the oﬄine CA attributes a single
pseudonym to every node after proper identiﬁcation and rings are only used for
authentication purposes. Hence, rings are unaﬀected by Sybil attacks. Actually,
as privacy is generated by the nodes, RSs can be viewed as a Sybil defense that
exploits the redundancy of mobile networks to generate a self-cloak.
Typical misbehavior remains possible in peer-to-peer wireless networks: For
example, a mobile node can engage in denial of service attacks. However, the CA
can exclude misbehaving nodes by revoking their keying material (as a signer
must own a private key to generate a ring signature). Thus, keys can be black-
listed using certiﬁcate revocation lists (CRLs) like traditional revocation algo-
rithms [42].
7.3 Cost
As ring sizes aﬀect the anonymity level, users will tend to create the largest
possible rings. But as ring signatures incur a communication and computation
overhead, ring sizes will be bounded by the acceptable performance overhead.
Computation Overhead. RS computational requirements depend on the un-
derlying trapdoor permutation, i.e., with ID-based ring signatures, one bilinear
pairing computation is required for each member of the ring. In other words, for
a node ui, the signature cost Csign is:
Csign ≈ ri · CBP (10)
where CBP captures the cost of a Bilinear Pairing. The veriﬁcation of a mes-
sage has the same complexity. Using FPGA hardware accelerators for bilinear
pairings [37], one bilinear pairing takes 61μs. In total, for a ring of size ri = 10,
Csign = 610μs. Without hardware accelerators, the eﬃciency of ring signatures
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in mobile phones depends on software optimizations: Currently, one bilinear pair-
ing takes 478ms on a 225MHz ARM9 processor [40]. If this is not usable, the
computation cost will eventually decrease as mobiles’ hardware improves.
Transmission Overhead. To sign messages with ring signatures, only the
ﬁrst authenticated message between two nodes must contain the ring. Subse-
quent messages will thus have a smaller overhead. A RS is an ri + 1 tuple:
(c0, T1, ..., Tri−1). Each of those tuples is taken out of the group G of prime order
q. Hence, the total size of the signature is (ri + 1) ·M bits where M = log2(q).
On top of the signature, a ring Ri is composed of ri pseudonyms of M bits.
Hence, the size of the signature grows linearly with the size of the ring. The
transmission cost Ctrans is:
Ctrans ≈ (ri + 1) · M+ ri ·M = (2ri + 1)M (11)
For example, assume that a node ui with pseudonym Pi creates a ring of size
ri = 10. For 128-bit security, NIST [32] recommends M = 283 with elliptic
curves deﬁned over a binary underlying ﬁnite ﬁeld of characteristic two (F2M).
The communication overhead of the ﬁrst message of each node is then 21 · M
bits and 11 ·M for subsequent messages.
8 Conclusion
We introduced the self-organized location privacy paradigm to solve the problem
of location privacy in wireless mobile networks. With this approach, the network
protects the location privacy of its nodes in a self-organized manner relying on
Ring Signatures. Using graph theory, we theoretically measured the eﬃciency of
the approach to provide anonymous authentication and derived its optimum. We
examined numerically diﬀerent ring construction strategies at the mobile nodes
and showed that regular constructions achieve near-optimal anonymity. Then,
we demonstrated that enabling nodes to communicate with each other increases
their respective privacy levels by means of simulations. Despite their lack of
knowledge of the entire network, mobile nodes achieve a high anonymity level by
relying, for example, on the popularity of pseudonyms. In particular, choosing to
connect to the least popular pseudonyms tops the achievable anonymity. Another
particularly interesting result is that mobility helps in establishing self-organized
anonymous authentication by improving the network awareness of every node
without compromising their anonymity.
Future Work. We will investigate the eﬀect of stronger adversary models on
the achievable anonymity, such as an adversary that compromises members of
the network. We will also extend the study of the eﬀect of social networks on the
construction of rings. In particular, social networks could provide information
(e.g., the social graph) to improve the eﬃciency of ring constructions. Finally,
we intend to complete our preliminary study on the untraceability of rings.
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A Proof of Theorem 1
Proof. We ﬁrst show that each node ui must have an out-degree douti = d
max and
then obtain the condition for achieving maximum anonymity. Assume a bipartite
graph G′ where at least one node ui ∈ U has douti < dmax. We add new edges
to G′ such that douti = d
max ∀ui, and obtain the graph G. Because no edges
were removed, G will contain at least the same number of perfect matchings
as G′. Adding new edges might actually increase the number of existing perfect
matchings and consequently increase the anonymity of the nodes. In other words,
to maximize their anonymity, each node must choose douti = d
max.
To maximize the entropy of each node, the random variable pj|i must have a
uniform distribution. Given a node ui, pj|i is uniform if and only if the number
of perfect matchings over (ui, Pj) is the same for all Pj ∈ Ri. A simple way to
verify this consists in comparing whether the subgraphs obtained by removing
any pair G\(ui,Pj) ⊆ G ∀Pj ∈ Ri yield the same number of perfect matchings.
The number of perfect matchings without (ui, Pj) will be the same for any
pair (ui, Pj) with Pj ∈ Ri, if and only if all subgraphs G\(ui,Pj) have the same
number of perfect matchings. This will be true if all subgraphs are isomorphic to
each other (i.e., belong to the same equivalence class). Consider two subgraphs
G\(ui,P1) and G\(ui,P2). An isomorphism of graphs G\(ui,P1) and G\(ui,P2) is
deﬁned as I : V(G\(ui,P1)) V(G\(ui,P2)) where V(G\(ui,P1)) is the vertex set of
graph G\(ui,P1). I deﬁnes an assignment of the nodes of G\(ui,P1) onto the nodes
of G\(ui,P2) such that ∀(ui, Pj) ∈ G\(ui,P1), there is (I(ui), I(Pj)) ∈ G\(ui,P2). A
necessary (but not suﬃcient) condition for the graph isomorphism to exist in this
case is that the graph is d-regular : Each vertex has the same degree d. Indeed,
if the degrees of vertices of two subgraphs cannot be matched (e.g., a subgraph
has a node of degree 5 while the other does not), then it is impossible for the
subgraphs to be isomorphic. Hence, we know that the graph will be dmax-regular
and that the entropy of each node will be log2(d
max).
